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On a question everywhere recognized as important, sustainable development, social 
and natural scientists have very different approaches, adduce different kinds of data, offer 
different policy recommendations. Persistence of these differences has the awkward result 
of puzzling the conscientious policy maker, in effect asking him or her to solve a problem 
that is too difficult for the scientists concerned. On the other hand it allows the policy 
maker who is less conscientious to act as suits his or her interests for extraneous reasons; 
there will always be some intellectual support for whatever he or she wants to do. 
The paper shows differences between social and natural sciences, specifically 
between those most closely involved, economics and biology, that help to account for the 
very different conclusions. These include the longer term perspective and the sense of 
contingency on the part of biologists, along with the view that mankind has arrived where 
it now is by adapting to the natural world, as against the shorter term interests, the 
intervention of the consciousness of participants, and the view that mankind is creative 
and not merely adaptive on the part of economists. For economists growth is now the 
normal condition; for biologists it is an aberration--an admirable one up to a point--of 
the last century or two. 
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THE LONG-TERM PERSPECI1VE: HUNTERS TO MEGACITIES 
Through most of the two million or so years that we tool-using creatures have lived 
on earth we adapted well to the environment. Technology, and hence income, rose 
slowly; centuries, millennia, passed without appreciable change. Population did grow, but 
gradually; as recently as the Neolithic, say 10,000 years ago, there were only about 10 
million of our ancestors spread out over all the hospitable parts of the planet, half as 
many as live today in Mexico City. Their average rate of increase to this point had been 
about 1/200,000 per year. That of ~ e h c o  today is over 5,000 times as rapid. 
With their small number and their simple and stable techniques for gaining a 
livelihood they did not greatly disturb the natural environment in which they lived. Say 
Lee and Devore of human existence before the Neolithic, 
The hunting way of life has been the most successful and persistent adaptation 
man has ever a~hieved.~ 
The adaptation was based on a very long experience--people have lived by hunting a 
hundred times as long as they have lived by agriculture, and several thousand times as 
long as they have lived by industry. 
But what those hunting cultures could not adapt to was the agricultural world of 
increasing populations and expanding economies. Three maps provided by Lee and 
Devore show the hunters pushed out of good agricultural land by the tillers, with their 
increasing numbers and effective technologies of cultivation and of war. Once spread out 
over much of the land area of the planet, the hunting and gathering peoples were driven 
to the hills and other less accessible and less desirable places by peoples who took to the 
new technology, agriculture. And now after 10,000 years only small enclaves of hunters 
survive. The Inuit of Canada, the Native Peoples of the United States, the Yanomani of 
the Amazon, the Moi of Vietnam, are as always defenseless against the invasion of more 
"advanced peoples, now drawn by the increasing commercial value of the diminishing 
forests. Their hunting grounds are clear cut for cattle ranches, paved over for cities. 
'Paper prepared for the Symposium of the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., Tuesday 
April 27, 1993. 
?Richard B. Lee and Irven Devore, Eds. 1%8. Man the Hunter. Chicago: Aldine, p. 3. 
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Figure 1. Map showing distribution of hunters at three points of time. Source: Lee and 
Devore, w., p. 14. 
On the test of who is pushing whom about, who is surviving and who is disappearing, 
the agricultural-industrial peoples are better adapted, Yet for Lee and Devore the matter 
of adaptation is not settled: the books are not yet closed. In their words, 
It is still an open question whether man will be able to survive the exceedingly 
complex and unstable ecological conditions he has created for himself. If he 
fails in this task, interplanetary archaeologists of the future will classify our 
planet as one in which a very long and stable period of small-scale hunting and 
gathering was followed by an apparently instantaneous efflorescence of 
technology and society leading rapidly to e~tinction.~ 
THE SHORTER PERSPECTIVE IS OPTIMISTIC 
To take the point of view of the hunters will in modem terms be called pessimistic 
and a retrogression, and I cite it only as one extreme of a range of expression on people 
and the environment. Academic economics will serve to define the optimistic extreme: 
with modem ingenuity, given scope and stimulus by free markets, shortages will be 
overcome and deterioration repaired. Say labor economists Bloom and   re ern an,^ 
The empirical evidence shows little relation between the growth of population 
and income per head or related economic variables. 
Environment is passed over. The data, as Bloom and Freeman interpret them, support 
a "population neutral" point of view (p. 58). As Goran Ohlins in a different setting 
summed up: 
There was no apparent relationship between population growth and economic 
growth. 
Similarly the U.S. White Paper released on the occasion of the 1984 Mexico City 
Conference: 
The relationship between population growth and economic development is not 
a negative one. 
In these writings the environment with its limitations is not central; it is expected to 
provide an adequate base for the economy as population and production rise. Any 
necessary costs of cleanup will be an affordable deduction from the increasing income. 
'David E. Bloom and Richard B. Freeman. 1988. Economic development and the timing and components 
of population growth. Journal of Policy Modeling 10(1):57-81. 
'Unpublished papers of the Friberg Conference, 1990. The same statement is to be found in many other 
places, including Nathan Keyfitz. 1977. Applied Mathematical Demoma~hy. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
where a scatter diagram shows clearly the lack of relation. 
DIFFERENT ELEMENTS ARE OPERATIVE IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM 
Disciplines concentrating on the here and now have not developed the means for 
handling change that takes place over decades and centuries--there is no reason why they 
should. Earth scientists, evolutionary biologists, ecologists, archaeologists, on the other 
hand, have time horizons long enough that they are familiar with changes in the 
environment and accustomed to studying them, and they are alarmed by the entry of a 
new element--human numbers and technology large and powerful enough to take their 
place alongside the forces of nature. 
For many of their problems the various disciplines do not touch one another; but 
now the short-term and the long-term fields have a point of contact: they overlap in 
respect of population and economic growth on the one side and environment on the 
other. 
Because of the overlap of interests those preoccupied with months are at the 
moment engaged in a lively controversy with those preoccupied by millennia. And the 
very different frameworks they have built up make them mutually incomprehensible. 
When biologists and economists try to talk to one another the biologists speak concretely 
about the fragile character of rain forests, and the economists more broadly about the 
power of substitution impelled by the price system. There is plenty of goodwill but 
effectively no dialogue. 
IMPLIED FLATI'ERY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 
Social scientists support their case with references to history, in this context to the 
history of the past two or three centuries. If anyone doubted the capacity of science to 
take care of us in the future let them just look back at the past; again and again there 
have seemed to be serious threats to our progress, shortages that looked as though they 
would be fatal, and yet we now number 5 112 billion and are on the average better off 
than ever. And as for the foreseeable future, 
There are no natural limits to the ability of the planet to support a great many 
more than 5 billion p e ~ p l e , ~  
always taking for granted that society will behave suitably and science will do its part. 
And the prospect for the distant future is still brighter: 
In the very distant future, if our descendants outrun the food-producing 
capacity of the earth, they will by that time be sufficiently skilled and wealthy 
to build themselves artificial satellites to live on.' 
?he London Economist, June 13, 1987, page 49. 
'Colin Clark. 1958. Nature 181:1235-1236. 
Natural scientists should be flattered by this confidence reposed in them. It is only 
they, after all, who can make the advances in fundamental knowledge on which the 
technology would be based, the technology that would permit 10 billion people to live 
prosperously on this same planet by the middle of the 21st century, even to colonize 
artificial satellites. 
RETICENCE OF SCIENTISTS 
Yet scientists do not accept the compliment; they take a view whose mature 
expression is given by the joint statement of this Academy and the venerable and equally 
distinguished Royal Society of London, that between them include a high proportion of 
the world's most creative scientists. I will refresh your memory by reading one sentence 
from the preamble: 
If current predictions of population growth prove accurate and patterns 
of human activity on the planet remain unchanged, science and technology may 
not be able to prevent either irreversible degradation of the environment or 
continued poverty for much of the world.' 
The conclusion at the end of the document followed from this preamble: 
Global policies are urgently needed to promote more rapid economic 
development throughout the world, more environmentally benign patterns of 
human activity, and a more rapid stabilization of world population? 
Inventing a new generation of contraceptives is put high on the list of recommendations 
as something that science can do. Beyond that, however effective science may be, 
it is not prudent to rely on science alone to solve problems created by rapid 
population growth, wasteful resource consumption and harmful human 
practices.1° 
Counting on science to fix things later could turn out to be as mistaken as damaging 
oneself by excessive drinking and smoking and expecting one's doctor to cure the 
consequences. 
This assertion of social scientists on the one side--that population creates no 
problems for the environment that cannot be fixed by natural science and the technology 
derived from it--stands against the assertion of the natural scientists themselves on whom 
'Population Growth, Resource Consumption and a Sustainable World. 1992. A Joint Statement by the 
officers of the Royal Society of London and the US National Academy of Sciences. Sir Michael Atiyah, 
President of the Royal Society of London and Frank Press, President of the US National Academy of 
Sciences. 
the solution is to depend; for them, with increased population the ecological problems 
may be intrinsic, beyond the capacity of anyone to deal with. 
DO WE ADAPT TO THE ENVIRONMENT OR CONSTRUCT IT? 
When the discussion becomes concrete, for instance on how far the growth of 
population and the economy can go before the environment is damaged, temporarily or 
irretrievably, it turns out that words have different meanings for the two disciplines. 
What does damage mean? If it is only the environment changing from what it is 
now as economic growth proceeds, that is taken for granted by economics; even the 
earliest agricultural peoples cut down trees to plant their small weedy patches of neolithic 
agriculture. Economics sees itself as dynamic; naturally man is changing the surface of 
the planet, and if some of the changes are disadvantageous that is temporary and 
remediable. If materials are used up they will be substituted as they have always been in 
the past--wood fuel by coal, coal by oil, copper by glass threads. 
But biologists have in mind something quite different from substitution of materials. 
The natural environment is what we have adapted to in a very intricate process that they 
are only slowly coming to understand, and they do not know how our adaptation will be 
affected by changes now being made. We are doing experiments of unprecedented 
magnitude with the earth itself--the platform on which we are standing--and if things go 
wrong and start moving in a dangerous direction we may well not be able to stop or 
reverse the movement. Paul Ehrlich speaks for biologists when he says: 
Natural ecosystems are still actively engaged in maintaining the planet's 
habitability-making it possible for over 5 billion to survive and a billion or two 
to thrive. Other organisms are functioning parts of those natural ecosystems; 
in the degree that we exterminate them, we imperil the capacity of Earth to 
support us and our descendants." 
And Peter Raven and Edward Wilson on biodiversity: 
Wild species ...p rovide essential services to the ecosystem, from the maintenance of 
hydrologic cycles to the nitrification of soils.12 
Even superficial reading shows how complex are the planetary systems on which we 
depend, how small a part of them is up to now mapped, classified, and understood. If 
even biologists do not understand the planetary processes, what about the rest of us? 
Economists see their subjects as dynamic rather than passively adapting. In one 
categorization of biologists, they are said to 
"Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1990. The Po~ulation Explosion. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
p. 260. 
12Peter H. Raven and Edward 0. Wilson. 1992. A fifty-year plan for biodiversity surveys. Science 258 
(November U):1099. 
reason about human affairs by analogy to species that do not systematically 
and purposively construct the environment from which they derive 
sustenance.13 
We should look carefully at this use of the word construct, whose importance was 
emphasized by its being printed in italics in the original. 
DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES USE WORDS DIFFERENTLY 
In fact in that one word construct quoted above from Preston lies a key difference 
between the two branches of knowledge. Does mankind construct the environment? Or 
does it modify, some would say tamper with, the environment? Again and again we have 
had to reverse a process that had been initiated, clean up air and water that had been 
dirtied, close down nuclear reactors, relocate deposits of dangerous waste; how sure can 
we be that we will always be able to backtrack, especially as the scale of our activities 
becomes larger with more people and more goods per person. The notion that we 
construct our environment has the appearance to some of a certain hubris. Stewart Udall 
evidently had it in mind when he wrote 
... we have consistently exaggerated the contributions of technological genius 
and underestimated the contributions of natural  resource^.'^ 
One could continue with other differences in language. Rationality is an important 
concept for economics; thus Amartya Sen: 
Rational behavior in the form of maximization of self-interest makes the 
analysis of individual behavior a good deal more tractable than a less 
structured assumption would permit .... [From it is derived] the Fundamental 
Theorem of Welfare ~conomics.'~ 
Biologists also deal with self-seeking, that is indeed widespread in animal behavior, but 
they do so under different names. They call the struggle for s u ~ v a l  what in economics 
is the market. Adam Smith's invisible hand corresponds to Darwin's and Dawkins's Blind 
watchmaker.16 The unguided and unplanned process of evolution brings a good 
'Samuel H. Preston. 1986. Are the economic consequences of population growth a sound basis for 
population policy? Pages 67-95 in Jane Menken, ed. World Povulation and US Policv: The Choices Ahead. 
The American Assembly and W.W. Norton. 
"Stewart L. Udall in William R. Catton, Jr. 1980. Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary 
Change. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Quoted by Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, and 
Jorgen Randers. 1992. Bevond the Limits: Confronting Global Collapse. Envisioninp a Sustainable Future. 
Post Mills, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing. 
H~martya K. Sen. 1987. Rational behavior. The New Palerave: A Dictionary of Economics 4:68-74. A 
broader view is taken by the same writer in his 1977 paper: Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral 
foundations of economic theory. Philosovhv and Public Affairs 6:317-345. 
"Richard Dawkins. 1986. The Blind Watchmaker. London: Penguin Books. 
outcome--what used to be called the survival of the fittest-& the same way as the 
competition in the market brings social welfare. For purposes of day-to-day 
administration, the market dispenses with Government, natural selection dispenses with 
God." So there are resemblances in the logic of the two disciplines, but these do not 
bring agreement on the substance. 
For example economics calls the extraction of oil from under the ground production, 
and its subsequent use as fuel for automobiles consumption; an ecologist is more inclined 
to think of the whole sequence of production and consumption as destruction and asks 
what purpose is served that can justify its ecological cost. Economics on its side does not 
ask people's purposes, and certainly does not evaluate their importance; it aims to set the 
conditions under which individuals will have as much of what they want as is possible for 
them to get, subject to other individuals having the same opportunity. 
Another concept that appears in both disciplines is equilibrium. For biology under 
most circumstances the environment sets limits within which innumerable species interact 
with it and with one another, and this ''web of life" is seen as in a kind of equilibrium 
most of the time. While the idea is familiar enough it is mostly implicit--I see one 
college textbook of biology that does not mention it as such; on the other hand Dawkins 
(page 210) does mention it as illustrated by a special kind of thermostat. 
For economics the first recorded use was by the Scottish economist James Steuart 
in 1769. The New Pal~rave has more than a dozen articles on one aspect or another: 
Equilibrium analysis ... has been the foundation on which economic the0 
been able to build up its not inconsiderable claims to 'scientific' status. 3 has 
While earlier in this century it was approached by counting equations and unknowns, 
more satisfactory methods have been developed in recent decades, in particular to take 
account of feedbacks and other nonlinearities. This is no place to elaborate, except to 
refer to one feature of the definition. Phelps speaks of 
an outcome, typically from the application of some inputs, that conforms to the 
expectations of the participants in the economy .... [Clorrect expectations 
appear to be the essential property of equilibrium, at least in the orthodox use 
of the term.19 
This is the inescapable requirement of all social science--that it take account of the 
expectations of participants, who interpose a layer of interpretation on all interactions. 
That is what makes economics and other social science in their way more difficult than 
natural science, and in particular more subject to divergent and changing viewpoints. 
"Danvin in his Autobiogavhy acknowledges Malthus aod the idea of population pressing against food 
supplies. If only some could survive which would they be? Here was a mechanism of selection. 
''Murray Milgate. 1987. Equilibrium: Development of the field. The New Palerave 2179. 
'%dmund S. IPhelps. 1987. Equilibrium: An Expectational Concept. The New Palerave 2177-179. 
This aspect will inevitably reappear throughout the present paper. We have to stress that 
such difficulties are not arbitrarily introduced by social scientists: they are intrinsic to the 
subject matter. 
Both economists and ecologists say that we do not know the mechanisms that are 
operating on the planet, and we should not interfere without knowing more. But the word 
"interfere" is used very differently by the two professions. The biologist sees us as 
drastically interfering right now, by what we do to the environment with our population 
and economic growth; the economist calls interference anything that would slow the 
economic growth. One more word to be added to the glossary of terms that each of the 
disciplines has to explain to the other. 
DIFFERENCE OF PERSPECTIVES: RESPECT FOR CONTINGENCY 
Beyond a difference of viewpoint on whether science can deal with the problems 
that have arisen and will arise with more people on this earth, and beyond differences 
of language, are differences of perspective. To the biologists that I read there are many 
possibilities at every stage, and if we have arrived over the course of millions of years at 
a condition where we are capable of discussing such matters as these, or even capable 
of speech, we are just lucky. They see nothing inevitable about it. 
Stephen Jay Gould may be in the forefront of those ready to drop the 19th century 
view that the whole history of the earth, perhaps of the universe, has been an 
unstoppable march to arrive at the goal of contemporary man. 'This common scenario 
is fiction rooted in traditional hopes for progress and predictability." He points out that 
Mammals spent their first hundred million years--two thirds of their total 
history--as small creatures living in the nooks and crannies of a dinosaur's 
world. Their sixty million years of success following the demise of dinosaurs 
has been something of an afterth~u~ht.~'  (page 318) 
The disappearance of the dinosaurs was by no means inevitable, and if they had stayed 
mammals would still be small creatures in the interstices of their world. This 
situation prevailed for a hundred million years; why not for sixty million more? 
He speaks of how quirky are climate and geography. 
Continents fragment and disperse; oceanic circulation changes; rivers alter 
their course; mountains rise; estuaries dry up. If life works more by tracking 
environment than by climbing up a ladder of progress, then contingency should 
reign. (page 300) 
'"Stephen J. Gould. 1989. Wonderful Life: The Bureess Shale and the Nature of History. New York: 
W.W. Norton. 
And he adduces South American geological evidence for "the powerful role of 
contingen cy... against our smug, placental-centered parochialism." (page 298). 
Similarly Paul and Anne Ehrlich, 
relatively rapid and severe environmental changes occurred on several 
occasions, with catastrophic consequences for the life forms existing at those 
times.21 
Such uncertainty in the historical process that brought us here conduces to a sense that 
the future is also uncertain, that we do not have matters under control, that we had 
better be very careful in what we do with this planet. 
The 19th century view that all this is opposing was most clearly expressed by 
Herbert Spencer. He could confidently assure his readers that 
Progress ... is not an accident, but a necessi ty.... It is a part of nature," 
and there could be absolutely no doubt about its continuing. This finds its reflection 
today in economic growth, that sums up all that is most admirable in the modem world. 
We expect economic production to continue increasing without any gap or interruption, 
if possible at 5 percent per year, but if that is not possible, then at least at some positive 
rate. Our children and our grandchildren will be richer than we are; if they are more 
numerous so that there are more problems of accommodating them, they will also have 
more powerful instruments for rearranging their environment. 
Apparently the sense that income is increasing all the time, that the worst that 
damaging the environment can do is to slow it by some affordable percentage, justifies 
for many people our inconsiderate way of treating it. Not only can we casually despoil 
for our passing convenience the house in which our rich relatives will be living, but 
beyond that we can borrow money from those future rich relatives without excessive 
concern about repayment. That is what happens to economics when it becomes debased 
in the political arena. 
CONFIDENCE 
For economics itself, a social science, people's attitudes are central, for natural 
science the attitudes of subjects can mostly be disregarded." If everyone thinks that a 
bank is insolvent then that bank will surely have to close its doors, however sound its 
balance sheet may be. Sociologist Robert Merton spoke of the "self-fulfilling prophecy" 
"Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990, OD. cit. 
qerbert Spencer. 1850. Social Statics, Part i, Chapter 2.4. 
=Robert K. Merton. 1936. The unintended consequences of purposive social action. American 
Socioloeical Review 1:894-904. 
to describe the general case where a belief, whether true or not, brings itself into 
existence. Label a boy a criminal, and that could lead him to criminal behavior. 
It is true, for good or for bad, that our prosperity depends--among many other 
things, of course--on our confidence in the future. As I write" Prime Minister Major 
is urging confidence on the British people to overcome the depression into which their 
country has settled. An exaggerated sense of limits of the environment, its incapacity to 
support more people, would add to other factors depriving people of confidence. 
This view that growth, and confidence in continued growth, leads to more growth 
comes up in many places. Alfred Sauvy, French demographer and economist, points out 
that closing down obsolete plants will arouse less resistance of workers if they have 
confidence that they can get jobs in newly established plants.2s And the current London 
Economist puts it well in accounting for the progress of Japan, 
Many of the different elements that fostered growth depended, in turn, on the 
assurance that growth would continue: lifelong employment, heavy investment 
in physical and human capital, the helping hand to struggling parts of the 
enterprise network, pro-business sentiment and lack of preoccupation over 
division of the spoils ... failing industries were obliged to shrink over time; that 
was alright too because payrolls were always expanding in other ind~str ies .~~ 
It is confidence that propels the positive feedback here described. 
So letting the public know that environmental prospects are not really bad recurs 
frequently. For instance David E. Bell, a respected economist and foundation executive, 
once Director of the US Bureau of the Budget: 
In the 1950s and 196 @...there was much concern in the United States that 
world population growth would outrun the world's resources, leading to 
widespread famine, social disruption, and conflict .... Cutting the rate of 
population growth was seen by many as an urgent necessity to prevent 
worldwide disaster. 
In retrospect, these fears were greatly exaggerated. In fact, the record of 
the past three decades has been remarkably good?' 
And Julian simon2' complained that the Meadows's in their Limits to ~ r o w t h , ~ ~  and 
- -  - 
"February 27, 1993. 
25Alfred Sauvy. 1980. La machine et le chomage (The machine and unemployment). Paris: Dunod. 
abThe Economist, March 6, 1993, p. 22. 
27David E. Bell. 1986. Population policy: choices for the United States. Pages U)7-228 in Jane Menken, 
ed. World Po~ulation and U.S. Policv. The Choices Ahead. New York: The American Assembly and W.W. 
Norton, p. 214. 
=Julian L. Simon. 1981. The Ultimate Resource. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 286. 
the Club of Rome that sponsored their work frightened many people. The Meadows's 
would take that as a tribute to their success; if some of the 9 million people who bought 
Limits were frightened that is the first step to reversing some of the damaging tendencies. 
Biology is unaffected by what trees or bacteria think of their results. Here is 
another dimension of the incommensurable nature of the two disciplines. 
THE NEW ECONOMICS AND THE OLD 
The revisionist neoclassical economics not only contrasts with biology but it differs 
sharply from 19th century economics. Until the middle of the 20th century economists 
and biologists alike were concerned about the limits of the earth. The fame of Malthus 
is based on his showing that unlimited reproduction and finite food supplies could not co- 
exist. And for John Stuart Mill, concerned with welfare if anyone was, 
After a degree of density has been attained, sufficient to allow the principal 
benefits of combination of labor, all further increase tends in itself to mischief, 
as regards the average condition of the people.30 
When Malthus was writing, the global population had not quite reached one billion, and 
in Mill's time it was not much more than that. Yet now when the population is 5 112 
billion their successors try rather to dispel our fears of overpopulation. 
DATING THE REVERSAL-1971 AND 1986 
The reversal of outlook in the social sciences occurred somewhat after the middle 
of the 20th century. There were early rumblings of the change; Julian Simon had started 
as a proponent of financial incentives to lower births, for instance for India, and it was 
about 1970 that he had a conversion and became the most hawkish of populationists. 
Going further towards setting a definitive date for the change, we may compare a 
NAS report of 1971 entitled Rapid Population Growth with a 1986 report entitled 
Population Growth and Economic Development. In both cases a small group of largely 
social scientists examined substantially the same questions, and came up with decidedly 
different answers. The 1971 report centered on 17 reasons why smaller populations 
would benefit the less developed countries and it backed family planning programs at all 
costs. At that time an economist of the highest standing1 could still say, 
Potential output per head will be higher in a stationary than in a growing 
population. One source of the increase will be greater investment per capita. 
%onella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows and Jorgen Randers. 1992. Bevond the Limits: Confronting 
Global Colla~se. Envisioning a Sustainable Future. Post Mills, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing. 
M~ohn  Stuart Mill. 1848. Quoted by S.F. Singer, Washington Post, February 22, 1970. 
31Joseph J. Spengler. 1971. Economic Growth in a Stationary Population. Paper given at PAA meeting, 
Washington, D.C., 1971. 
To this source two others may be added: The fraction of the population of 
working age will be higher, and less capital will be required to countervail the 
pressure of population upon components of man's natural environment which 
are depletable or nonaugmentable. 
Expressed in numbers, this was the model that had been used by Code and ~ o o v e ~ - ~ *  
in 1958, and that had found substantially faster economic growth in India and in Mexico 
if they slowed their population growth. 
The 1986 report;3 in contrast, had good as well as bad to say for the effect of LDC 
population growth on welfare. That NAS Working Group, of which the members were 
economists or  demographer^,^^ did not see population growth as a serious handicap to 
development. It asked among other questions, as the title of its Chapter 3, 
Will slower population growth alleviate pollution .... (page 35) 
That way of phrasing the question is based on the view that growth is the natural 
condition, but aside from that the wording is unfortunate. In logic there is no way that 
growth of any positive amount, small or large, could alleviate pollution. A different way 
of stating the question is needed if it is to mean anything. It could have been "Will 
slower population growth slow the rate of pollution?" or else it could concern absolute 
numbers of people. A smaller absolute population might or might not alleviate pollution, 
and special methods not related to population might alleviate pollution, but if the present 
wording asks whether doing a little more of what we are now doing can as such help the 
environment the answer is obviously no. 
The 1986 NAS Report spoke of positive ecological effects of population density, in 
that the shortage of space and resources could force privatization, and once the resource, 
say a forest, was privately owned, the incentive to look after it would come into play. 
Instances noted by Ester ~oserup" were cited. The work of Ansley Coale and Edgar 
Hoover that had been the chief basis for the large family planning programs sponsored 
by the United States in the 1960s and 1970s was only referred to in passing. The report 
made much of the writing of Julian Simon, and emphasized the right of couples to choose 
the numbers of their children, a purely ethical matter on which none of the members of 
"Ansley J. Code and Edgar M. Hoover. 1958. Povulation Growth and Economic Development in 
Low-Income Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
aNational Research Council, Working Group on Population Growth and Economic Development, 
Committee on Population. 1986. Povulation Growth and Economic Develo~ment: Policv Ouestiom. 
Washington, D.C. National Academy Press. 
W ~ e m b e r s  were D. Gale Johnson and Ronald D. Lee, co-Chairs, Nancy Birdsall, Rodolfo A. Bulatao, 
Evan Mueller, Samuel H. Preston, T. Paul Schultz, T.N. Srinivasan, and Anne D. Williams. A new committee 
has since been appointed with approximately the same assignment, chaired by John P. Holdren. Its report 
is not yet available. 
=Ester Boserup. 1990. Economic and Demoera~hic Relationshivs in Development. Essays selected and 
introduced by T. Paul Schultz. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press. 
the Committee had a claim to special knowledge. However admirable human rights are, 
we cannot derive them from the findings of either social or natural science. The report 
ended with 
On balance, we reach the qualitative conclusion that slower population growth 
would be beneficial to economic development of developing countries. 
a statement too moderate to satisfy ecologists, let alone the family planning community. 
And even less conclusive: 
Thus there appears to be a legitimate role for population policy, provided its 
benefits exceed its costs.36 
One would have thought that there is a legitimate role for anything if its benefits exceed 
its costs. Is that the strongest argument that can be put forth for population control? 
1974 AND 1984 
We can confirm the dating of the change by noting the attitude of the United States 
delegation to the World Population Congress in Bucharest in 1974, with its stand in the 
World Population Congress in Mexico City in 1984. Again a reversal,' and in the same 
direction, and also expressed in policy terms. In 1974 the US had pressed the LDCs to 
control their populations. It was not long after the day of Stephen Enke and his 
calculation that 
development programs may do 15 or more times better when they invest in 
slowing population growth rather than in accelerating output growth.37 
subsequently made use of by President Johnson: 
Let us act on the fact that $5 invested in birth control is worth $100 invested 
in economic growth.38 
The LDCs resisted somewhat, but by 1984 they had become convinced. Now it was the 
turn of the US to hold back on birth control. The official position of the United States 
Government had changed drastically in the 10 years: 
Wational Research Council, OD. cit., p. 91. 
%tephen Enke. 1968. Raising Per Capita Income through fewer Births. Publication 68-TMP-9. Santa 
Barbara, Calif: General Electric-TEMPO. 
Stephen Enke. 1%0. The gains to India from population control. Some money measures and inentive 
schemes. Review of Economic Statistics 17(2):175-81. 
%President Johnson, June 25, 1%5, Speech before the United Nations. 
In 1984 at the Mexico City UN Conference on Population the United States 
delegation announced a change ... contained in the phrase "population growth 
is, of itself, a neutral phenomenon." This phrase represented the point of view 
of a number of scholars and economists (sometimes referred to as "supply side 
demographers") .... 39 
The delegation's paper went on to say that "more people do not necessarily mean less 
growth." It and the NAS Working Group report both said in effect that any problems 
arising out of more people would be dealt with by new technologies developed under the 
impulse provided by free and competitive markets. 
IS THE RELATION OF POPULATION TO ENVIRONMENT VISIBLE? 
We like to think that our policy recommendations to fix something are based on a 
causal analysis taking account of the facts. If a kitchen tap is leaking we immediately 
suspect that the cause is a worn washer, and this is confirmed when we replace that 
washer and the tap no longer leaks. In this case the causal mechanism can be 
(metaphorically) described as close to the surface; no need for scholarly investigation, for 
construction of models, for debate. Only if the mechanism of a phenomenon is hidden 
can controversy be generated about where it is really located. Our population and 
environment debate on its methodological side ranges around the degree of obviousness 
or hiddenness of the causal mechanisms underlying the problem. 
So for the reading world the controversialists fall into two groups--those that 
consider the problem to be much deeper than it appears, and so requires extensive study, 
and those who see little to study--the problem is plainly too many people right now, and 
on present tendencies far too many in the future, and promotion of birth control is the 
short-term answer for which the present emergency calls. If you don't believe that people 
are destroying the environment, just go to China, Bangladesh, or Java and see for 
yourself. Or just look around the United States and read about the exhaustion of fossil 
water supplies in the Southwest or shortage of landfill sites for waste in the East. Or 
don't travel at all, but just read what numerous observers report in various crowded parts 
of the world. 
HOW TO FORM A JUDGMENT? OBSERVATION ON THE GROUND 
What is the testimony of knowledgeable scholars who have gone on missions to deal 
with some specific problem? They study the history of a small area, observe the way its 
people live, and draw their conclusions without announcing any methodology. 
Thus we find a paragraph in the report of Richard Ford and Janet Welsh Brown on 
Kenya: 
'William H. Sullivan, President of the American Assembly. 1986. Preface. Pages 3-5 in Jane Menken, 
ed. orldPoDulation New York: The American Assembly and W.W. 
Norton, p. 4. 
But continuing peace and prosperity for Kenya are not assured. Rapid 
population growth, combined with slowing growth of Kenya's agricultural 
sector, portends a crisis in food production. If current trends continue, by early 
next century Kenya could have twice as many people to feed, with land that 
may have lost in some areas up to half its productive potential from soil 
erosion alone. Because Kenya is heavily dependent on agriculture to sustain 
its economy, such a crisis could well lead to political and economic disruption. 
If Kenya's fundamental problems of productivity and population are not dealt 
with, Kenyan crises could be on our front  page^.^ 
Perhaps experts are asked to make recommendations on slowing down deforestation. 
Seema Agarwal, looking at the forests of Burma (renamed Myanmar by its present 
government), sees deforestation in its dry zone as due to population pressure?' 
Perhaps it is a matter of the extreme pollution of seacoasts. A Canadian team 
looking at Indonesia's coasts found that with increasing economic and population growth 
many estuaries and coastal waters have passed the limits of their absorptive and 
rejuvenative capacities." 
Perhaps it concerns the economic progress of one region of a country. James F. 
Hicks and Herman E. Daly see the population growth (nearly 5 percent per year) of 
Ecuador's Amazon Region as creating extraordinary pressures, significantly reducing the 
region's potential to contribute to Ecuador's economic de~elopment?~ 
IS SOME SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY? 
Lay people, however well-educated and experienced, who pronounce on the matter 
do not see a problem for study here. To them the problem is as completely on the 
surface as the problem of the leaking tap. Let me quote what some say. 
Few lay people have had better opportunities to observe what goes on than Robert 
McNamara: 
"'Richard B. Ford and Janet Welsh Brown. 1990. Land, resources, and people in Kenya. Pages 121-163 
in Janet Welsh Brown, ed. In the U.S. Interest. Resources. Growth. and Securitv in the Develo~ine World. 
Boulder: Weshiew Press, p. 121. 
4'Seema Agarwal. 1987. S c o ~ e  of Bioloeical Diversitv in Burma. with Special Commentarv on the Role 
of Women. USAID. 
4 2 C I D ~  team. 1992. Marine and Coastal Sector Development in Indonesia, Vol. 1. Hull, PQ: CIDA. 
Reviewed in WRI, 1993 Directorv of Countw Environmental Studies, p. 152. 
43James F. Hicks and Herman E. Daly. 1990. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. As summarized in WRI, 
1993 D i r e c t o ~  of County Environmental Studies, p. 129. 
[ q h e  greatest single threat to the economic and social advancement of the 
majority of peoples in the underdeveloped world is rampant population 
gr~wth."~ 
And Vice President A1 Gore, who likewise has had a chance to see the world more 
extensive than most of us: 
No goal is more crucial to healing the global environment than stabilizing the 
human population?s 
or to go back a few years to 1968, just after he left office, President Eisenhower: 
Once, as President, I thought and said that birth control was not the business 
of our Federal Government. The facts changed my mind. I have come to 
believe that the population explosion is the world's most critical problem. 
Without knowing any of these people, I suggest that they do not claim any special insight 
or special scholarship; if they have read the technical debates they do not refer to them. 
If they were challenged they would simply give instances of places they had seen where 
the overpopulation was obvious. 
THE PROBLEM IS NOT SO EVIDENT 
Yet there are two shortcomings of inspection on the ground. What looks like an 
effect, and is indeed an effect, of population growth in the short run, may have quite 
different results in the course of more time. The 1986 NAS and other reports insist on 
this distinction between short and long run. And secondly cases are all special: surely we 
need some more general basis for policy. No satisfactory model is yet in sight; should we 
not be looking? 
Economists say certainly; we need a deeper understanding of the long-term effects 
of what is happening if the action taken with good intentions is not to produce hannful 
results. There are theories, models, and empirical evidence showing that the relation of 
population to income and environment is not the simple matter the people on the ground 
may think; their judgment can be deceived by appearances. Hidden mechanisms are at 
work, and we have to uncover them before we will know what to do. Statistical evidence 
is often cited to show that the problem is not obvious and solvable by common sense. 
"Robert S. McNamara. 1973. One Hundred Countries. Two Billion Peo~le :  The Dimensions of 
-1. New York: Praeger Press. As quoted by Allen C. Kelley. 1988. Economic consequences of 
population change in the Third World. Journal of Economic Literature 26(4):1684-1728, p. 1685. 
*rAl Gore. 1992. Earth in the Balance. Ecolog and the Human S~irit.  New York: Houghton Mifflin, p. 
307. 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE: SELECTION AND INTERPRETATIOP 
Thus absolute numbers of people are increasing fast and easily give the impression 
that population is growing out of control. Even the annual increase of population is still 
rising, so one can say that the growth is accelerating. By the end of Table 1 in 2020 
population will still be rising and annual increase will be as great as it is now. The birth 
columns of Table 1 suggest that it will be half-way in the first quarter of the 21st century 
before births peak, and well into the second quarter before the absolute number of births 
will come down even to the high levels of today. 
Table 1. World population, births, and birth rates, 1950-2020; absolute numbers in 
thousands, crude birth rate (CBR) per 100,000 population. 
World 
Population CBR Births 
That is the obvious condition of the unanalyzed statistics. But even the first step of 
a more sophisticated analysis, the calculation of rates, shows something different: rates 
of birth in the world have passed their peak; they now are lower than they were a decade 
ago and their decline will probably continue. This is the way that the NAS Working 
Group4' shows the population data. The decline shown in such a representation of the 
data encourages the view that the population problem is now under control, and 
projecting the trend shows that stationarity will be reached in two or three decades. 
Since the dawn of statistical observation writers have selected numbers according 
to the point they are trying to make. There are no rules against this, and no scholar 
proposes to stop the practice. Such data are soft and flexible enough that they can be 
used on either side of an argument with equal force. 
q h i s  particular example of alternative explanation has been used before in a different connection: 
Nathan Keyfitz. 1992. Seven ways of causing the less developed countries' population problem to disappear--in 
theory. Euro~ean Journal of Po~ulation 8(2):149-167. 
"National Research Council, OD. cit. 
Figure 2. World population, births and birth rates. Source: United Nations. 1988. World 
Demographic Estimates and Projections. 1950-2025. 
CROSS-SECTIONAL CORRELATION AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
Among the various ways of assembling data that will bear on the effect of 
population none is more common than the scatter diagram of population growth against 
income growth, for countries as the unit. As long as a variety of countries is chosen, the 
picture always fails to show any relation. It is what experimenters call a null result. 
The number of such charts that appear in the literature must be in the dozens. 
Every scatter diagram showing income increase against population increase in the past 
looks the same. I have shown one such picture myself;48 a more recent portrayal due to 
Ansley ~ o a l e ~ ~  follows as Figure 3. 
Percent Increase in Per Capita Income (versus percent increase in population) 
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Figure 3. Scatter-diagram showing population increase against income increase. Source: 
Coale, M., p. 98. 
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Does the null correlation demonstrate that population growth is no hindrance to 
economic growth? Of course not; all authors are aware of the uncertainties in inferring 
causation or its lack from such a cross-sectional relation. 
West Africa 
hiiddle Africa 
To make a test we put the numbers in an analytical framework. Let us suppose that 
in reality population and its increase drastically check economic progress at the outset, 
but that after some development has occurred the birth rate starts to fall, and the 
& 1 1 I 1 I 1 I 
0 I 2 3 4 
O/o ANNLrAL INCREASE IN POPULATION 
@~ns ley  J. Coale. 1986. Population trends and economic development. Pages %-I04 in Jane Menken, 
ed. World Population and U.S. Policv. The Choices Ahead. New York: The American Assembly and W.W. 
Norton. 
negative relation is reversed. Let us also suppose that any extensive list of countries 
contains some in both the early and the later phase. Then the mix would show the null 
relation that we see in Figure 3. 
To show that such diagrams do not prove causation either way, suppose that the 
correlation showed 1.00 between population growth and economic growth. Does that 
prove that population growth forces economic growth? Not at all; it could equally well 
prove that economic growth permits population growth--in fact this is the Malthusian 
model. 
Beyond this, the correlation of 1.00 between population growth and economic 
growth could be consistent with no relation at all. It could be that both are influenced 
by some other variable, and they have absolutely no direct causal relation to one another. 
For example education could both lower the death rate (so increasing the rate of increase 
of the population) and also speed development. This positive effect could entirely hide 
any negative effect of population growth itself. Didier Blanchet lists a variety of other 
possibilities that are alternatives to a positive effect of populat i~n.~ 
CAN MODELS DECIDE THE ISSUE? 
The first test of any model is whether it proves too much. If it shows that 
population is always too large, or that more people can always be fitted in without 
damage to the environment, then it had better be dropped. The one thing we can say 
with assurance is that there are circumstances where there are too many people, and 
others where there are not enough. Most observers agree that Bangladesh is 
overpopulated, that the United States in the 19th century was underpopulated. Yet a 
model like that of diminishing returns on land always proves that there are too many 
people, and the possibility of increasing division of labor always comes with more people 
and is necessarily beneficial. Any model that cannot distinguish between the two cases 
cannot be helpful. The objection that it proves too much applies to any general 
formulation using only one or two variables. 
But what about more complex models, that try to take in all the factors operating? 
Michael chadwicksl has collected some ten instances of such work, all of them 
operating with enough variables that their authors could claim to have taken account of 
food, technology, consumption habits, everything bearing on the question. No one has 
analyzed the mechanics of these models in detail, that are simply meant for computer 
calculation. 
They cannot all be correct, for they have enormously different outcomes. Forrester 
and the Meadows' found the collapse of the entire world industrial system unless some 
limits were imposed; Mesarovic and Pestel were milder in their conclusion, seeing only 
the need-for international cooperation and coordination at the level of a "New World 
50Didier Blanchet. 1991. Notes and commentary. Population and Develo~ment Review 17(1). 
SIMichael J. Chadwick. 1!?92. The Biosphere and Humanity. Paper presented to the 20th Anniversary 
Conference of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, May 13, 1!?92. 
Order." The report of the Bariloche (Argentina) investigators was milder yet: with new 
aid policies funded by 2 percent of the industrial countries income all would be well. 
FUGI (Japan) found that with coordination of investment to shift it to the LDCs 
harmonious growth could be obtained all around. And so on. The variety of models, not 
made casually but worked on over years, is convincing evidence that however illustrative 
of possibilities the models may be no one of them proves anything. The collection shows 
the wide range of possibilities. 
More hopeful would seem to be the standard models in terms of which economics 
makes its inferences. We think back to the classical three factors of production, land, 
labor and capital, that until this generation were the way of explaining production. With 
these an increase of population, i.e. labor, in the face of the same land and capital, 
inevitably implies a fall in production per person. But today land and capital in the 
classical sense have disappeared from production models. 
Thus environmental-leaning Herman Daly speaks of neoclassical economic theory 
that 
suffers from a total failure to distinguish the problem of optimal allocation of 
resources from the problem of the optimum scale of the entire economy 
relative to the ecosystem in which the economy is physically embedded.52 
In the same way, ~ c ~ i c o l l ' ~  points to 
the oddity of the virtual invisibility of total population size in modern 
demography ... Population size has no implications for family structure, hence 
for behaviors determined within that structure ... Constructing a demography 
where scale matters is an urgent task for the discipline. 
Of course scale--how big are population and other elements of the economy--is the 
essence of the environmental problem, while allocation---which individuals and groups 
get what--affects the environment less. So why does economics neglect scale when it is 
so obviously relevant to all of its work, and not only the present subject? It does so, 
explains Kelley, 
because useful estimates of scale effects are unavailable [and] substantial 
difficulties are encountered in assigning a value to the environment for future 
generations.54 
S2Quoted by Men C. Kelley. 1988. Economic consequences of population change in the Third World, 
Journal of Economic Literature 26(4):1684-1728, p. 1719, from Herman E. Daly. 1986. Review of Population 
Growth and Economic Develovment: Policv Questions, in Povulation and Development Review 12(3):582-585. 
53~eoffrey McNicoll. 1992. The agenda of population studies: A commentary and complaint. Population 
and Develo~rnent Review 18(3):399-420. 
That is certainly t rue4 have found no feasible suggestions on how to proceed on this 
difficult matter. Kenneth ~ r r o d '  has provided an elegant way of assessing irreversible 
alterations in the environment, and Robert ~ o r f m a n ' ~  has in his own work and the work 
of others that he has promoted provided the best instruction so far to be had on how to 
think about the environment. But Kelley's point about the difficulty of finding numbers 
still stands. 
NEGATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL EF'FECI'S 
We have to note that many of the most damaging environmental consequences of 
population growth have in the rich countries been cleared up in recent years. Examples 
often cited are London's polluted air of 25 years back and many of Europe's rivers. 
Economic theory has a way of explaining how pollution that no one wants occurs 
nonetheless, and in terms of this explanation real problems can be solved. Most of these 
are the result of externalities, costs that producers or consumers can shift to others, and 
can be overcome through the normal operation of the price system; all that need be done 
is to tax in the right places. Yet such taxes would have to be legislated, and the main 
argument for a free economy is that it does not depend on the whims and political 
considerations that move legislatures. But now we hope that legislatures will act in the 
economically right way on the particularly sensitive matter of taxation, as long as it 
involves something important like environment. 
Yet internalizing of externalities is especially difficult in regard to childbearing. If 
the cost of children is only partly paid by their parents, and part by the community for 
their education and other services, then standard theory tells us that there will be more 
children than there would be if all costs were covered by parents. Such direct costs are 
calculable in money and for the relatively short term. (Though Samuel Preston presents 
the case against externalities having much bearing on fertility decisions.") 
Here is one matter in which it is inconceivable that legislatures will internalize costs. 
No one, parent or bachelor, would today vote for making education optional and putting 
its whole cost onto parents; once the child is born he or she has to be educated at least 
up to literacy--for ability to hold a job and be a responsible citizen. Beyond this if the 
country is already densely populated, longer-term non-monetary considerations suggest 
that there will be "too many" children born from the viewpoint of income of the next 
generation, though this is impossible to estimate quantitatively. And beyond this 
economic non-quantitative consideration, more children will be born than would be 
considered good by the subsequent generation in view of the destruction of the 
"Kenneth J.  Arrow and A.C. Fisher. 1974. Environmental preservation, uncertainty and irreversibility. 
Ouarterlv Journal of Economics 88. 
9obert  Dorfman and Nancy Dorfman. 1992. Economics of the Environment: Selected Readma. 2nd 
Edition. New York: Norton. 
nSamuel H. Preston, about 1985. The Annals. 
environment, again speaking of a country that is already crowded." Will legislators take 
the viewpoint of later generations, knowing that these will not have votes until after they 
are dead? It is hard to be hopeful on this. 
ECONOMICS: THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
Let us then continue with our examination of statistical evidence and the logic of 
the inferences made from it. One item, especially salient in the patient and exhaustive 
researches of Simon ~ u z n e t s ~ ~  is the fact that our own industrialization got under wa 
at exactly the same time as world population began to accelerate. Angus Maddison 2 
provides (Table 2) a recent set of estimates, for 16 countries, now industrialized, over the 
past millennium and a half. 
Table 2. Performance characteristics of four eras. Source: Maddison, M., Table 1.2, 
p. 6. The sample includes sixteen countries, twelve from Europe, plus Australia, Canada, 
Japan, and the USA. 
Annual Compound Growth Rates 
Population Per Capita GDP 
500-1500 0.1 0.0 
1500- 1700 0.2 0.1 
1700-1820 0.4 0.2 
1820- 1980 0.9 1.6 
It will be seen that as the rate of increase of the population grew so did that of the 
per capita Gross Domestic Product. That was the first time in world history that such a 
phenomenal growth of population has ever occurred, and certainly the first time for 
industrialization and its accompanying rise of income. When over the course of thousands 
of years two events occur within a few decades of one another they must surely be 
related. The sense of a relation is strengthened when we note that the fall of the birth 
rate during the 1920s and 1930s was accompanied by the fall in income of the 1930s, the 
subsequent rise of births after the War by a rise in income, and subsequent fall of the 
birth rate in the 1970s by a slowing of the increase of income, even a decline by some 
measures. 
What seemed the natural interpretation of such facts to most of the 19th century 
economists was that couples took out a certain part of the increase of their incomes in 
children, and in the extreme expression they did so completely, and that prevented any 
possibility of a rise in income per head--ever. A series of writers from Malthus (in the 
%ome of this is in Paul Demeny. 1986. Population and the invisible hand. D e m m a ~ h y  23(4):473-487. 
*Simon Kmets .  19n. Po~ulatioa Ca~ital and Growth. New York: Norton. 
60Angus Maddison. 1982. Phases of Capitalist Develo~ment. New York: Oxford University Press. 
First Edition only)61 to Richard R.   el son^^ constructed models embodying this causal 
mechanism. If Thomas Carlyle could write of "Respectable Professors of the Dismal 
Science,la it was as much as anything in reference to the extreme Malthusian view that 
man's lot could never improve, because he was constantly breeding himself into continued 
poverty. Population growth was so fast they feared that it would not ever stabilize again, 
that is not without the increase of deaths. 
But what if the causation was the other way round--the increase of population was 
what brought about the increase of income? That hypothesis, daring to show itself after 
more than a century in which the world had convinced itself of the Malthusian view, and 
at first presented hesitatingly as a speculation, has removed any basis that might have 
existed for calling economics dismal. It rather put economists in harmony with the 
optimistic carpe diem attitude of the present time. 
Of course if we are to conclude on this basis that countries that are currently 
industrializing need not concern themselves much with their increases of population we 
have to eliminate some other possibilities than that it was population growth that had 
that beneficent effect. For one thing absolute sizes of population have multiplied by an 
order of magnitude--from the England of 9 million people at the start of the 19th century 
to the China of 1.1 billion or the India now approaching 900 million. Can we not argue 
that it was the smallness of the English population that gave it such a possibility of 
development, rather than the revisionist view that the rapid growth was the cause of 
development? True it was larger than it had been earlier, but perhaps it needed to grow 
just enough for the division of labor to operate, and at 9 million it had done so. 
I hope that I have quoted enough materials in this and the just preceding sections 
to carry conviction that the evidence for a relation between population and either 
development or environment is extremely weak. 
WEAK EVIDENCE VERSUS A WEAK RELATION 
But we have to beware of confounding two quite different propositions, that because 
of a shortcoming of language are expressed in the same words. We know evidence is 
indeed weak, for all the reasons above stated and others. That is not my private view 
alone, but the view also of the eminent scholars above quoted. Is it possible that the 
effects of population themselves, the harm it does to development and to the 
environment, are very strong and negative even though they cannot be measured or 
estimated? The same writer, in the same book, will speak of the inadequacies of the data 
and the difficulties in its interpretation, and then that writer will conclude with something 
like 
61Thomas Robert Malthus. [I7981 1%7. Po~ulation: The First Essay. With a foreword by Kenneth E. 
Boulding. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
'%chard R. Nelson. 1956. A theory of the low-level equilibrium trap in underdeveloped economies.= 
American Economic Review 46 @ecember):896908. 
-hornas Carlyle. 1950. Latter Dav Pam~hlets No. 1. 
the empirical evidence shows little relation between the growth of population 
and income per head or related economic variables." 
Is this an assertion regarding the data--the fact that it does not prove anything--or is it 
a substantive assertion regarding the causation of economic growth? The English 
language is such that that sentence can be interpreted either way; one way entirely 
correct, the other wholly unjustified. 
The confusion causes real trouble when the failure to support a relation between 
population growth and development or environment is taken as an argument against 
family planning. Think of the assertion that there is little statistical evidence to support 
giving family planning high priority. The statement is literally true if interpreted as 
expressing a limitation of the data, but the trouble comes when it is taken as a 
recommendation against family planning, as on a quick reading it can easily be. At the 
level of action it can be positively dangerous. 
To repeat, 'The data do not support vigorous family planning policies" can mean two 
very different things: 
Family planning policies could be crucially necessary but the data do not have a 
bearing on that one way or the other, 
The data prove that family planning policies will do little good. 
This ambiguity of language, common to English and French but not to Germaq6' 
has caused a great deal of trouble. The linguistics of the matter is not what concerns me 
but the use of one meaning that is clearly true to imply another meaning that is wholly 
unsubstantiated. I have many times heard exactly this statement made as though it was 
a substantive assertion capable of opposing family planning programs, where it is only 
true as a methodological statement qualifying certain kinds of data. 
If neither statistics nor complex models are capable of proving much, we may be 
driven back to giving an elementary identity a common sense interpretation. 
THE PROPORTIONALITY HYPOTHESIS 
Consider the proportionality hypothesis, that for many is the natural first step in 
thinking about population. 
@Bloom and Freeman, OD. cit. 
6SH.W. Fowler (A Dictionarv of Modern Enelish Usagg, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1%5) takes up a related issue. Thus "all that glitters is not gold" could mean either that notlung that glitters 
is gold, or that there are things that glitter that are not gold. In this case the latter is plainly intended, but 
in the case that is important for this argument one meaning is what the data say, the other an illegitimate 
inference from the data, merely intended to persuade. 
A doubling of population would ordinarily not be burdensome if the stock of 
capital and the natural resource endowment could double at the same rate.66 
If there is a 5 percent increase of population there will be, as a first approximation, a 5 
percent increase in all the difficulties, as well as a 5 percent increase in all the benefits. 
More generally we can write the identity: 
Damage to environment = Population x (Damage to environment / population), 
as far as I know originally used (in a somewhat more elaborated form, not necessary for 
the present purpose) to Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner. No one can deny the truth 
of this as so written, and in one form or another it is often taken as showing 
incontrovertibly that damage is proportional to population. Including twice as many 
automobiles, twice as much city crowding, twice as many slums, twice as many wars, twice 
as many refugees. 
But others stress that there would be twice as many geniuses, twice as many 
entrepreneurs. Note the possibilities of selection of which items to apply the 
proportionality rule to. 
The identity is bound to be true at any one moment, but the question for those who 
would apply it as a substantive proposition is to decide whether it is true with change 
over time. That depends on the factor within parentheses being constant: will the 
increased population at some future date do as much damage per person to the 
environment as the population is now doing? Will people be living the same way, each 
consuming the same amount of energy, as people are now doing? And if they are, will 
the marginal impact be the same over the range of population densities in question? 
LESS THAN PROPORTIONAL DAMAGE: THE BOSERUP EFFECT 
Against the observations of apparent negative effects of growth, Ester ~ o s e r u p ~ '  
describes instances in which a clear positive effect appears, where population pressure 
forced technical and institutional change. She observed long-fallow (slash-and-burn) 
agriculture, that with tropical soils allows for only two or three crops before the tillers 
have to move on, and where they cannot return for as much as 40 or 50 years. When the 
population is too dense to support that kind of agriculture they change to a more settled 
technique with short fallow, fertilizers, green manure, in which the land can support over 
10 times as much population. Beyond such technical improvement with density, Ester 
Boserup reports cases where population increase has been the agent of change of 
institutions in directions--especially privatization--that induced people to be better 
custodians of the environment. 
*~ster  Boserup. 1981. Population and Technolopica1 Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 
and Boserup, 1990, op. cit. 
That is undoubtedly true of some instances, but there are other instances in which 
the opposite is true. The people among whom I lived, in East Java, were irrigated rice 
cultivators with a traditional response to crowding. Clifford Geertz offers the best known 
description of their lives.68 As one expects, the response depends on the way crowding 
and land shortage is interpreted; they saw it as necessitating sharing, and the result was 
declining incomes with increasing population in my village, until the village was rescued 
by an exogenous element--the highly productive seeds and planting techniques of the 
Green Revolution provided by the central government. 
Both mechanisms are of much interest to a student of society, as showing how the 
impact of a physical change--population growth--depends on the interpretation of it 
derived from the preceding culture. 
MORE THAN PROPORTIONAL 
At least proportionality seems a fair starting point, the direction of modification that 
seems to apply in particular cases. Insofar as the people in question have to cultivate 
poorer land their average level of living will be lower with twice as many people. Insofar 
as they have a larger market for industry their average will be higher, except that if they 
have free trade with the rest of the world their larger market at home will make little 
difference. And if they pass the sustainable limit of a renewable resource, like the fishery 
or forest, so that it collapses, then the negative population effect will be far more than 
proportional. 
Paul Ehrlich gives many instances quite aside from renewable resources where once 
density passes a certain point the effect will be more than proportional to the population 
increase. For example he suggests a threshold effect for the air of a city: 
If there are only a few thousand cars in a city, natural air movements may 
carry away the noxious effluents, and rainfall may cleanse the air so that there 
is little or no health hazard. A few hundred thousand motor vehicles, however, 
may easily overwhelm these natural dispersal and cleansing functions, and 
produce life-threatening smog.69 
CAUSATION IS SLIPPERY 
An economist discusses evidence and proof on the relation of population on the one 
side and progress on the other. 
The amount of solid empirical work on the subject is limited, especially for 
developing countries, partly because the subject is not really a tractable one for 
quantitative analysis ... The only natural experiment available for analysis is 
human history; cross-section analyses are a poor substitute ... [Blecause 
6BClifford Geertz (1%3) 1971. Agricultural Involution. Berkeley University of California Press. 
qhrlich and Ehrlich, 1990, OD. cit. 
population change is both consequence and cause of economic change, its 
effects are hard to trace... To be tractable, such models require simplifying 
assumptions: on the substitutability of labor for capital in production, for 
example, and the rate and sources of technological ~ h a n g e . ~  
The substitutability of labor for capital is indeed a crucial aspect of the problem. I once 
lived in a village in Java where the local carpenter made looms on which the women 
wove cloth. Labor physically created capital at the local level, so the substitutability 
would be high, and models based on this could well show economic space for more 
people. But would not additional people have more trouble finding a livelihood in the 
same village if capital had to be bought outside the village, or outside the country? I 
would think that in this common condition the substitutability would be less, and so the 
return to increments of labor less. 
And Simon Kuznets, who looked into such matters more thoroughly than anyone 
else I know of, agreed: 
[Wle have not tested, or even approximated, empirical coefficients with which 
to weight the various positive and negative aspects of population growth?' 
We have it similarly from Allen Kelley, a highly respected economist who is also a 
demographer, who goes further into the reasons why empirical resolution of the questions 
is difficult. For one thing we need "a formal model that reveals and measures the 
economic outcomes of alternative population scenarios," and "the problems of 
constructing such a model are formidab~e."~ Over the 60 or so years to which the model 
must apply if it is to be useful for this purpose, institutional change, intractable to 
modelling, is bound to occur, and the model has to embody feedbacks in which it is 
impossible to distinguish causes from effects. 
When limits of land came to be overlooked earlier in the century and Malthus' food 
constraints were put aside as technology produced more and more per hectare, stress 
came to be laid on shortage of capital for development as the reason for controlling 
population. Fewer children required less parental expenditure, less community 
expenditure for schools. But perhaps parents work harder because they have more 
children to support, so savings will remain just as high with many children as with fewer. 
After mature consideration of this question Geoffrey McNicoll concludes 
%ancy Birdsall. 1989. Economic analyses of rapid population growth. Research Observer 4(1):23-50, 
p. 24. 
"Simon Kuznets. 1960. Population change and aggregate output. In Demorrra~hic and Economic Chanee 
in Develo~ed Countries. A Conference of the Universities-National Bureau Committee for Economic 
Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 339. As quoted by Kelley, OD. cit., p. 1686. 
What then can be said about the net savings or investment impact of rapid 
population growth? The answer appears to be very little.n 
In default of other evidence we have to clutch at the most solid straws we can find. 
And one of these straws is cross-national correlations, referred to above, and on which 
there is a considerable literature. But Ronald Lee gives his evaluation of this literature, 
and I am the last to contradict him: 
[Tlhese cross-national studies have not provided what we might hope for: a 
rough and stylized depiction of the consequences of rapid population growth; 
unless, indeed, the absence of significant results is itself the result.74 
Kelley agrees: 
[Sltatistical correlations provide little prima facie information about the size 
or nature of the net impact of population growth on economic 
In the end it turns out that the empirical data are a less solid indicator than one 
would like to think, and one's opinion depends on rather simple models that one carries 
around in one's head. The 19th century had the idea of marginal productivity--that the 
increment of population would have to take up submarginal resources, and so would 
lower the average income. That applies especially in resource-intensive activities, 
agriculture in particular. The 20th century thinks more in terms of manufacturing in 
which returns increase with larger markets, so more people is beneficial. But "most 
technical economies are realized b firms of moderate size," though there are X exceptions.76 For Code and Hoover limited capital was the reason why income per 
head would be higher with fewer people--once population had increased to the scale of 
India or Mexico. And with the service economy neither land nor capital is very 
important, so it would seem that population can expand indefinitely. 
Do we give up the economic and demographic research at this point? No, far from 
it--we must try harder. That is what all the authorities I have quoted on the inadequacies 
of present data say or clearly imply--Simon Kuznets, Nancy Birdsall, Allen Kelley, Ronald 
Lee, Geoffrey McNicoll. And pending more solid empirical results what help can be 
offered to policy makers? I submit that the only possible guide to policy is nothing better 
or worse than intuition, most often based on something like the proportionality 
assumption above described, and that may be summarized, "if the new population 
'JGeoffrey McNicoll. 1984. Consequences of rapid population growth: An overview and assessment. 
Po~ulation and Develo~ment Review 10(2), as quoted by Kelley, g ~ .  tit., p. 1716. 
74~onald D. Lee. 1983. Economic consequences of population size, structure and growth. IUSSP 
Newsletter, No. 17, pp. 43-59 (Jan.-Apr.). Quoted by Kelley, OD. cit., p. 1701. 
7%elley, OD. cit., quoting EA.G. Robinson. 
"Coale and Hoover, OD. cit. 
behaves as the old then an increase of 1 percent in population will increase 
environmental difficulties by 1 percent." For many reasons this is in most instances a 
minimum estimate. 
SCHOLARS LIKE THE SUBJECTS THAT THEY STUDY 
A common feature of all disciplines is that scholars like the subjects that they study. 
Anthropologists like the peoples among whom they live in much discomfort, and 
taxonomists like the species they identify and classify. The point is raised by Samuel 
Preston in commenting on a statement of the President of the Environmental Fund: 
These modes of thought seem to come particularly easily to biologists and 
ecologists, who as a group are almost surely endowed with an above-average 
reverence for nature and are inclined to view man's intrusions as violations of 
a sanctified order.78 
Ecologists do not deny that they like nature. Thus Paul and Anne Ehrlich put that 
first among the four values of biodiversity. 
As the dominant species on earth, homo sa~iens  has an ethical, stewardship 
responsibility towards humanity's only known living companions in the 
universe. Second, ... biodiversity has aesthetic values. Third, ... direct economic 
values ... Fourth, ... an array of free ecosphere services, without which civilization 
could not exist.79 
All four have their place--disputes concern only the order. 
Nor is it necessary to study for a doctorate in biology to appreciate the wonders of 
the natural world. Anyone, whatever his or her discipline, who attentively reads a clear 
description of a tropical rain forest, or of the behavior of bats, or of the detective work 
by which geologists and archaeologists have been able to provide a history of past life on 
earth, will be fascinated by these subjects. So one is astonished to read that 
... no single exhaustible resource is essential or irreplaceable; it is valued for its 
economic contribution, not for its own sake.80 
As biologists like nature, so economists like economic growth. They regard as a 
predominating objective the ever-increasing production of commodities and services. 
Ecologists also like free markets and maximum possibilities of choice, but they worry that 
automobile travel would be less if roads were not subsidized, and the demand for home 
energy intensive equipment is artificially spurred by advertising that itself wastes 
materials. 
P a u l  R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich. 1992. The value of biodiversity. Arnbio 21(3). 
Wational Research Council, OD. cit., p. 86. 
Values cannot but come into the matter; people have to decide these for themselves; 
all agree that science cannot tell them what they should do, but ecologists believe that 
science should be more active in telling the consequences of different kinds of behavior. 
THE COMMODITY CYCLE AND THE CONNECTEDNESS OF THINGS 
That study of consequences has been perhaps the main contribution of the 
ecological movement in recent years. It has drawn attention to the commodity cycle, 
much shorter for economics than for ecology. For the economist it starts with the 
exploration that discovers the iron ore or the petroleum deposit and ends once the car 
leaves the showroom and the gasoline is pumped at the service station. Anything that 
happens after those moments is of no consequence for the Gross National Product-- 
houses are the only item that is followed after the moment of sale to the consumer. 
For the ecologist the oil cycle starts a hundred million or more years earlier, when 
the oil got into the ground, and keeps on through the time when emissions are released 
as the car is driven to the effect of the nitrogen compounds on the forest and the effect 
of the carbon dioxide on the global temperature. For steel the cycle starts with the iron 
ore, continues through the use of the car, its scrapping, perhaps its presence for many 
years on the landscape, finally its disposal as landfill that integrates it with the ground 
again. 
What has the length of the commodity cycle to do with population? A great deal; 
if the cycle ends at the moment of sale then any effects, good or bad, that might result 
from its use are omitted and hence invisible. If the commodity does not disappear into 
thin air the moment the consumer takes possession of it, and trying to follow its path, 
then the number of people who buy and ultimately discard it will be decisive for the 
environment. And that number is seen by ecologists as a simple product--the population 
and its level of consumption. 
Economists see the matter otherwise. If the aftereffects of consumption are of 
concern that will show itself in the market and will be handled in many ways. People will 
buy smaller cars, as they did in fact after the oil crisis of 1973; people will insist on less 
packaging. The European housewife is charged the equivalent of $.I0 for a bag to carry 
her groceries out of the store, so she brings her own bag. The moment that the public 
becomes concerned about any problem prices will reflect that concern. Including that they 
will spontaneously alter to respond to any difficulties caused by more people. 
Of course the market will not operate to the social advantage unless people are 
charged the full costs of their decisions--including the smoke that harms the neighbors' 
lungs, the destruction of landscapes that will affect their children. The one admitted role 
of government is to ensure through taxes that such externalities are included in costs, 
which is to say that they are internalized. When that is done there will then be nothing 
to fear from more people. 
Ecologists agree, but only in part. In the play of interests that constitutes democratic 
politics, how can anyone hope that such fine tuning of prices will emerge? Those who 
assert most vigorously the incompetence of governments are also the ones to argue for 
trusting with governments this supremely important task. Fewer rather than more people 
will not solve all problems, but if it solves any part of the tangle that is to the good. 
Working with the longer commodity cycle reveals another feature of our industrial 
life, the connectedness of things. It was Barry ~ o r n m o n e r ~ ~  more than 20 years ago, 
who had the general insight on this, and urged us to follow through the consequences of 
the commodity cycle. And he referred to the work of Rachel Carson, writer and marine 
biologist, who ten years earlier had drawn to the attention of a wide public some 
unexpected effects of the use of DDT. 
As crude a weapon as the cave man's club, the chemical barrage has been 
hurled against the fabric of 
DDT was shown to have the effect of thinning the shells of birds' eggs, and it worked its 
way through the marine food chain, to the point where its use in the United States and 
Europe diminished the number of penguins around the South Pole. DDT was quickly 
phased out and replaced by less harmful chemicals, but it was part of what developed the 
sense on the part of scientists that perhaps fixing things with technology had some limits. 
EXTRA-ACADEMIC INFLUENCES 
The sharp change of viewpoint in the latter half of the 20th century, along with the 
extraordinary difficulty of securing clear proofs of causation, makes one wonder to what 
extent the extra-scholarly influences have been at work. Kelley raises the point when he 
says that one of the reasons for the reorientation of scholarly population thought could 
be 
a changed political climate--a return to traditionalist views about the family, 
and challenges to overnment's family-planning policies, especially those 
relating to abortion. & 
Responsible writers on the subject all concede that the statistical evidence for the 
population effect on development and on the environment is weak. It depends heavily 
on the model into which the data are fitted. We have no way of interpreting numbers 
without putting them into some kind of model; the number of possible models is infinite, 
and it is extremely difficult to coax the observations into selecting which one is congruent 
with them. Thus Livi-Bacci describes two camps:84 
' ' ~ a r r ~  H. Commoner. 1971. The Closine Circle: Nature. Man. and Technol-. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
%ache1 Carson. 1987 [1%2].$lent S~ring. 25th Anniversary Edition. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
"Massirno Livi-Bacci. 1992. A Concise History of World Po~ulation. Cambridge, MA: B l a h e l l .  
[For one] the link between demographic growth and environmental 
degradation seems clear, judging from the pollution caused by industrial 
expansion ... [The other] has complete faith in the ability of populations to 
adjust to larger numbers. Technological progress ... allows substitution of 
primary resources, costs can be 'internalized' [to protect the environment] ... the 
physical and economic well-being of world population is constantly improving 
as a result of scientific and economic progress. 
He has little confidence in existing statistical or other data as instruments for judging 
catastrophism versus optimism: 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to choose between these two modes of 
foreseeing the future (page 198) [and hence] control [of population] tends to 
be less and less a matter of calculations and more and more one of values. 
Yet perhaps science can go one stage further than proposed by Livi-Bacci, and 
continue its work of clarification of the conditions for a rich and unpolluted world. I 
have tried to present, in as symmetrical a form as I could, the views of ecologists and 
economists. If each of the disciplines .would respect the authority of the other in the 
territory over which they overlap, they would lessen the burden for lay people of deciding 
between them, and would raise the standing of both disciplines. That is at least the first 
step towards an answer to what could well be the most basic issue of our time. 
